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Since the publication of Mr. Buckland's article in the Decem-
ber number of the JOURNAL, the Supreme Court of Indiana and
the Court of Appeals of New York, have again grappled with the
question of the power to compel physical examination in case of
injury to person. While it is hardly fair to say, post hoc, ergo
propter hoc, yet it is remarkable that both of the above-named
tribunals have cited and followed the recent decision of the United
States Supreme Court (U. P. R. Co. v. Botsford, 14i U. S. 250),
referred to in Mr. Buckland's article. In the Indiana case, Penn-
sylvania Co. v. Xeumeyer, 28 N. E. Rep. 86o, the court rejects as
obiter what is impliedly held in Hess v. Lowrey, 122 Ind. 226, and
after quoting at length from the Botsford case, says: "So far as
we know, the courts of this State have never attempted to exercise
such a power, and we are of opinion that no such power is inhe-
rent in the courts. We think the better reason is against the exist-
ence of such a right and in the absence of some statute upon the
subject, we do not think the courts should attempt to compel liti-
gants against their will to submit their persons to the examination
of strangers for the purpose of furnishing evidence to be used on
the trial of a cause."
In the New York case, McQuigan v. D. L. & W. R. Co., 29
N. E. Rep. 235, the court over-ruling Walsh v. Sayre, 52 How. Prc
334, and affirming Roberts v. Railroad Co., 29 Hun. 154, cites and
quotes with approval the Botsford case, saying: "We concur in
the view taken by the Supreme Court of the State and the Supreme
Court of the United States, and we can add very little to the full
discussion to be found in the opinions of those courts. * *
We cannot say that the exercise of the power claimed might not in
some cases promote the cause of justice, and prevent the consum-
mation of fraud. On the other hand, unless carefully guarded, it
would be subject to grave objections. But we have to deal only
with the question of the power of the courts in the absence of any
legislation. It is very clear that the power is not a part of the rec-
ognized and customary jurisdiction of courts of law or equity.
The doctrine that courts have an inherent jurisdiction to mould the
proceedings to meet new conditions and exigencies is true, but in
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a limited sense. They cannot, under cover of procedure or to
accomplish justice in a particular case, invade recognized rights of
person or property. No court, we suppose, can abrogate an estab-
lished rule of evidence, as, for example, the rule that hearsay evi-
dence is inadmissible, or the rule of the common law that parties
shall not be witnesses, or that interest disqualifies. They may
apply existing rules to new circumstances. Nor is it, we conceive,
within the power of the court to create remedies unknown to the
common law, or institute a procedure not according to the course
of the common law. It is most important that courts should pro-
ceed under the sanction of an orderly and regulated jurisdiction,
and that as little as possible should be left to the discretion of a
judge. The exercise by the court of the power now invoked, as has
been shown, is not sanctioned by any usage in the courts of England
or of this State. Its existence is not indispensable to the due
administration of justice. Its exercise, depending on the discretion
of the judge, would be subject to great abuse. We think the
assumption by the court of this jurisdiction, in the absence of stat-
ute authority, would be an arbitrary extension of its powers. It is
a just inference that an alleged power which has lain dormant dur-
ing the whole period of English jurisprudence, and never attempted
to be exercised in America until within a very recent period, never
in fact had any existence." The Illinois Supreme Court in passing
upon this subject in the recent case of St. Louis Bridge Co. v. Mil-
ler, 28 N. E. Rep. iogi, strangely enough makes no reference to
Parker v. EnslOW, 102 Ill. 272, which decided the question squarely
against the exercise of the power but avoids the point, though
with the following significant words: "Without intending, then,
to intimate an opinion that, under any circumstances, the court
could properly have required the plaintiff to submit to the exam-
ination asked for, we are fully satisfied that the motion as pre-
sented was property denied." In view of these opinions we agree
with The Central Law Journal that the present tendency since the
decision of the Botsford case seems to be in the direction of the
denial of the power to compel examination.
The subject of strikes is so worn and trite that he who reads
will probably run A vast chaotic discussion by politicians, econ-
omists, socialists and every manner of ists, and isnt's under
heaven have left the subject very much where it was before-
only not so simple and clear. Few mortal men have left any
desire to search, or any hope to find the golden nugget of truth
in the residuary mud bank of this quasi-scientific voluminosity;
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and most mortal men begin to apprehend an historic fact, namely,
that when all the theorists and thinkers have ended, the practical
every-day world moves on in a more or less obtuse indifference to
their conclusions; and the institutional life of society waxes and
wanes not by forced intellectual processes but under the silent all-
powerful influence of unseen laws. But the lawyer cannot afford
to neglect a careful study of strikes and labor organizations. It is
his business to devise laws by which the relations of man to man
is adjusted in the State. It may soon be his duty to devise a sys-
tem of laws by which the relations of organizations to the citizen
and the State may be adjusted and equalized. The invasion of
these powerful bodies into a society based on notions of individual
right and liberty has dislocated the whole system. The present
strike of coal miners in England illustrates most emphatically the
helplessness of the State in modern life to protect itself. And yet
self-protection is said to be the fundamental law of society. One's
notion of things gets confused when he observes all the rest of a
great society watch a great organization deliberately shake the
whole fabric of commerce from turret to foundation stone, and
threaten as a tyrannic ruler might, to shatter it to pieces unless
their demands are satisfied. Certainly a State whose laws permit
such a thing cannot be said to afford self-protection, neither is the
maxim that men must use their own so as not to injure others
applied to freedom as it is to property. It is evident that there
must be a reformation of law to meet altered phases of modern
life, or else modern life itself is likely some day and any day to
become a raging storm center of conflicting organizations in
whose tumult the individual must fare as he can. One thing
which is clear but not perhaps trite, is that the class organiza-
tion of the modern State means the decentralization of power;
that such class organization is an essential and splendid factor
in modern civilization is not in question, but that it strips vio-
lently off and transfers a tremendous power over life from the
central State government and lodges it in irresponsible organiza-
tions. The balance of power upon which the safety of modern
civilization depends can only be maintained by conferring on the
State itself some counterbalancing and equivalent power. When
the Anglo-Saxon idea of individual liberty is so used as to destroy
all liberty is it not time for everybody, except smooth-tongued
politicians, to call a halt ?
The Supreme Court has decided that Lau Ow Bew can remain
in this country. The case has been a remarkable one and con-
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tains a great many interesting points. Lau Ow Bew is a Chinese
merchant, and for the past seventeen years has resided and done
business in this country. He left for a temporary visit to China,
and on his return the master of the vessel on which he sailed
refused to land him, because he had not procured a certificate
from the Chinese government stating his place of residence and
former and present occupation or profession, as required by Act
of Congress of 1882, as amended by act of July 5, 1884. The
Circuit Court for the Northern District of California refused his
application for a writ of habeas cortus and ordered that he be
deported from the United States and returned to China. As
authority for this decision the Circuit Court relied upon the case
of Wan Shiing v. U. S., 140 U. S. 424, and upon the statute, which
provides that such certificate "shall be the sole evidence permissi-
ble on the part of the person producing the same to establish his
right to enter the United States;" and it further added, that it
seemed probable that Congress intended the rule to apply to all
coming here, whether for the first time or otherwise, although it
seemed to work a hardship in this particular case.
The newly created Circuit Court of Appeals for the Pacific
Coast circuit affirmed this decision, and although it had final juris-
diction over the case, it was brought to the Supreme Court, by
the exercise of its power to order cases of sufficient gravity and
importance to be certified to it for decision. (The power of the
Supreme Court to do this is discussed at some length in Mr. Fos-
ter's article in the February number of the JOURNAL on "Recent
Decisions Under the Evarts Act ").
The Supreme Court says, reversing this decision, that "it was
not intended that commercial domicile should be forfeited by tem-
porary absence at the domicile of origin, nor that resident mer-
chants should be subjected to loss of rights guaranteed by treaty
if they failed to produce from the domicile of origin that evidence
which residence in the domicile of choice may h'ave rendered it
difficult if not impossible to obtain."
* *
The Supreme Court of the United States, in the recent case of
in Re Green, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. ii, held that it had no power to
compel a State court to restore to his position a lawyer whom it
had disbarred.
